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THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH OF MR. JUSTICE BLACK 
Tinsley E. Yarbrough 
Students of the judicial function in constitutional cases can be grouped into 
essentially two camps, with members of each firmly committed to the prop-
osition that the Constitution is capable of governing , but with each also differing 
fundamentally over the document 's role in the governing process . Proponents 
of interpretivism contend that th~ Constitution, rather than judges, can govern 
only if courts mirror, as faithfully as humanly possible, the intent of its framers. 
Non-interpretivists, on the other hand, recoil at the notion that the meaning 
of constitutional provisions should be determined primarily by reference to text 
or original intent. Instead, they claim that words are rarely self-evident in 
meaning, that historical records are ambiguous and incomplete, that the framers 
never intended that great constitutional generalities be given a meaning locked 
in time, and that historical intent is in any event largely irrelevant to contem-
poray needs. For them, the Constitution's meaning should, or inevitably must, 
be drawn essentially from current values rather than from language or history. 
The Constitution can and should govern, non-interpretivists conclude , but as 
a very general guide and admonition, not as a time-bound "strait-jacket " limiting 
society 's ability to cope with modem problems. 1 
During his thirty -four years on the Supreme Court, and in the Senate 
before that, Hugo Lafayette Black was a persistent critic of non-interpretivist 
thinking and the nation's most visible proponent of interpretivism. Black railed 
against judges who would substitute their policy judgments for the Constitu-
tion's language and the intent of its framers. For him, the Constitution was to 
govern, not as an admonition but as literal law; and any deficiencies in the 
document were to be remedied through the amendment process , not via the 
resourcefulness of "language-stretching" judges. Jurists who sought to enlarge 
or reduce the Constitution's meaning under the guise of interpretation were 
not merely ignoring the method of constitutional change provided by the foun-
ders; they were affronting the genius . of the written Constitution , a Constitution 
intended to bind judges as well as other officials. At one point or another, all 
jurists cite language and historical intent in defending their interpretations of 
constitutional provisions. But arguably no other American judge has been as 
consistent, committed, and sincere an apostle of interpretivism as Justice Black 
was, even though that conception of the judicial function led him down liberal-
activist paths in certain cases and in conservative-restraintist directions in 
others. 
Among his brethren, Justice Black won few, if any, adherents to his judicial 
philosophy or approach to specific constitutional issues. Scholarly commenta-
tors, moreover, have subjected his jurisprudence to intense criticism - prob-
ably the most systematic and scathing attacks ever directed at the thinking of 
an American jurist. 2 It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that Justice Black is 
invariably included among the greatest judges ever to have occupied a seat on 
the high bench. 3 Possible explanations for this irony abound. Persons who 
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consider his jurisprudence simplistic, naive, unachievable, or irrelevant may 
still admire the confidence and commitment with which Justice Black advanced 
his views, his lucid opinions, the general thrust - if not the precise doctrinal 
underpinnings - of his approach to many constitutional issues, and the enor-
mous influence he exerted over the broad directions of Supreme Court decision-
making during his lengthy tenure. I suspect, however, that preceptions of 
Hugo Black as one of the giants of American law lie largely, too, in a grudging 
respect for the very judicial philosophy many found so offensive, in the logically 
consistent approaches to specific constitutional issues Black's interpretivism 
generally yielded, and in a basic longing for judicial decision-making which 
transcends the policy preferences of sitting judges. 
This brief article examines and evaluates the contours of Justice Black's 
interpretivist approach to constitutional interpretation and its application in the 
context of specific issues. The article's major thesis is that Black's interpretivist 
jurisprudence provided a workable, if imperfect, means for limiting the reach 
of judicial power without at the same time destroying the Constitution's char-
acter as higher law. 
JUDICIAL PIIlLOSOPHY 
Justice Black was an admirer of the English legal reformer Jeremy Ben-
tham, and the basic tenets of Black's judicial philosophy are similar to those 
of John Austin and other legal positivists. 4 Early in their Supreme Court 
years, Justice Frankfurter termed Black- a "Benthamite," adding that Ben-
tham, in "his rigorous and candid desire to rid the law of many far-reaching 
abuses introduced by judges . . . was not unnaturally propelled to the oppo-
site extreme of wishing all law to be formulated by legislation, deeming 
most that judges do a usurpation by incompetent men as to matters con-
cerning which he believed them guilty of 'judicial legislation."' 5 In a percep-
tive article published near the end of Black's career, moreover, Paul Freund 
wrote that "there is more than a touch of Jeremy Bentham in Justice 
Black." 6 
There were several essential elements to Justice Black's interpretivist/ 
positivist judicial philosophy. 7 First, as Justice Frankfurter noted of Ben-
tham, Black took the position that lawmaking is a legislative, not a judicial, 
function. Unless the Constitution required a policy pronouncement of judges, 
they were to scrupulously avoid making such judgments, even in the face of 
what they considered to be inadequacies in the document's text. Second, ac-
cording to Black, judges were to construe constitutional provisions and stat-
utes in light of the intent of their framers, focusing of the "literal" meaning 
of the words used or other indicia of intent, not on moral or social consider-
ations. The Justice agreed that the intent behind a legal provision can be 
elusive and that, in such situations, a judge can properly attach what he con-
siders to be an ethical or socially desirable construction to the law or consti-
tutional phrase at issue. But he insisted that such "penumbra!" situations 
rarely arise, agreeing with modem positivist H.L.A. Hart that "to be occu-
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pied with the penumbra is one thing; to be preoccupied with it is another." 8 
Black also conceded that certain constitutional provisions, most notably the 
Fourth Amendment's ban on "unreasonable" searches and seizures, require 
policy judgments of judges. In his view, however, few portions or our basic 
law clothed judges with such discretion. 
A third tenet of Justice Black's judicial philosophy was his agreement 
with the legal positivists that, in a certain sense, law and morals are sepa-
rate entities. He obviously had no doubts about the enormous influence 
moral considerations inevitably play in the development of law. Absent ex-
plicit constitutional or statutory authorization, however, he believed that the 
influence of such factors, like other policy predilections, should be confined 
to the legislative arena. Finally, in order to limit the range of judicial discre-
tion and to assure that law was intelligible to the common man as well as 
the legal scholar, the Justice stressed the need for clarity, precision, and 
consistency in the law and in judicial opinions as well. He regularly urged his 
clerks to use simple, clear language in their legal writings, 9 and his own 
opinions were almost invariably models of brevity and clarity, whatever their 
substantive merits in particular cases. More important, his interpretations of 
the First Amendment, due process, and other constitutional provisions 
rarely allowed for judicial determinations of reasonableness, fairness, or so-
cial utility. 
CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATIONS 
Justice Black's interpretivist/positivist judicial philosophy pervaded his 
approaches to all constitutional issues. His thirteen-paragraph opinion in the 
Steel Seizure Case, 10 for example, is a classic statement of separation of 
powers doctrine positivist style. The Court's decision in the case had the ef-
fect of halting the Truman Administration's seizure of the nation's steel 
mills, but the dissenters and all but two of the six-man majority either re-
fused to take the position that the President had no "inherent" power to 
deal with "emergencies" or chose not to articulate a position on the issue. 
Justice Black had no such qualms. Since the President's military powers did 
not reach seizure of domestic industry, Black asserted, his authority must 
flow either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution. Congress not 
only had not provided such power; it had specifically refused to authorize 
seizure in the manner in which President Truman had acted. Nor, signifi-
cantJy, did Black find any authority in the Constitution's conferral of execu-
tive power on the President. The constitutional provisions vesting 
"executive" authority in the President, he contended, themselves refuted 
the notion that he was to be a ''lawmaker." Yet the seizure order "did not 
direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by 
Congress. " Instead, it ordered "that a presidential policy be executed in a 
manner prescribed by the President" - an action clearly not authorized by 
the Constitution or by the laws of Congress. n In a paragraph appended to 
Black's opinion, Justice Frankfurter deemed "the considerations relevant to 
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the legal enforcement of the principle of separation of powers . . . more 
complicated and flexible than may appear from what Mr. Justice Black has 
written. " 12 But the issue was simple enough to Black's legal positivist mind: 
the President's lawmaking powers were limited to recommending to Con-
gress legislation he thought good and vetoing that he thought bad. 
Black's opposition to the Supreme Court's reviews of state laws regu-
lating interstate commerce also reflected his preference for lawmaking by 
legislative bodies. Contending that the Constitution grants Congress, not the 
federal courts, power over interstate commerce, he dissented from the phi-
losophy of a long line of cases striking down state laws thought to impose 
"undue" or "unreasonable" burdens on interstate cornrnerce. At times he 
challenged the majority's judgement that a particular state regulation was 
"unreasonable." But his disagreement with the Court's position in such 
cases was much more fundamental. When a 1945 majority invalidated an Ar-
izona statute limiting the length of trains, for example, he not only attacked 
the Court's conclusion that the burdens the law created outweighed its 
safety features; he also questioned the majority's authority to make such 
judgments, contending: 
the Arizona County Court acted, and this Court today is 
acting, as a "super-legislature" . . . Representatives 
elected by the people to make their laws, rather than 
judges appointed to interpret those laws, can best deter-
mine the policies which govern the people. That at least 
is the basic principle on which our democratic society 
rests. 13 
The tenets of Black's interpretivism - and the controversy their appli-
cation so frequently aroused - are perhaps best seen, however, in his approach 
to the Constitution's civil liberties provisions. We begin with the two aspects 
of his constitutional philosophy which have attracted the most extensive analysis 
- his First Amendment jurisprudence and his support for total incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights into the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. As is 
well known, Black took the position that "direct" governmental abridgment of 
First Amendment freedoms is absolutely forbidden. The Amendment begins 
with the command that "Congress shall make no law"; and, for Black, a self-
described "backward country fellow," "no law" meant "No Law." 14 Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, during oral argument in the Pentagon Papers Cases he 
took great delight in the efforts of Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, a persistent 
critic of Black's absolutism, to convince the Court, in Griswold's words, that"it 
is ... obvious that 'no law' does not mean 'no law." 15 Rather than embrace 
such verbal gymnastics or the more insightful argument that there is a difference 
between "speech" and "freedom of speech," or bog himself in the conflicting 
interpretations of the intentions of the First Amendment's framers, Black held 
firmly to the position that speech, writings, and pictorial or electronic equiv-
alents thereof were entitled to absolute protection from "direct" interference 
by government. He thus rejected all such attempts to control "libel," "slander," 
"obscenity," "subversive advocacy," and other forms of expression traditionally 
subjected to some degree of governmental control. 16 
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At the same time, he opposed any enlargement of the Amendment's 
meaning beyond what he considered its "literal" terms. He emphasized that 
the Amendment protects "speech," not conduct, and rejected the "speech-
plus, " "symbolic speech," and related doctrines under which picketing, street 
marches, sit-ins, and the wearing of political symbols have been brought within 
the provision's scope. 17 While the Amendment specifically protects the "free 
exercise " of religion, moreover , he construed that guarantee within the context 
of its speech and press companions, arguing that the free exercise clause, like 
the other guarantees, protected only thought and communication - religious 
"beliefs" and "speech, " as he put it18 - not every action to which a person 
might attach a religious label. He also rejected the notion that the First Amend-
ment entitles a person to exercise the rights guaranteed there wherever or 
whenver wished. Government, in his judgment, could control or forbid access 
to public property for purposes of expression, just as landlords generally can 
control access to their property. 19 Justice Black did not reject all judicial scru-
tiny, however, over regulations of time, place, and manner or other "indirect" 
controls over speech and its speech-related counterparts. He took the position 
that such regulations were constitutional only if applied with an even hand 
(rather than selectively, with an eye toward censorship), if other means were 
not available to accomplish the regulation's purpose, and if the need to control 
the conduct in question was sufficient to justify the regulation 's "indirect " effect 
on free speech. 20 
Justice Black's First Amendment jurisprudence clearly reflects the strains 
of his judicial philosophy. His absolutist approach to most First Amendment 
issues largely eliminated the judicial discretion inherent in the clear and present 
danger standard, balancing, and other formulae generally applied in First 
Amendment cases. His refusal to exclude from First Amendment protection 
obscenity and other types of expression having the same form as protected 
expression further narrowed the range of judicial choice. And arguably his 
approach to most First Amendment issues offered more clear-cut guides than 
did his colleagues' more flexible alternatives . His distinction between direct 
and indirect infringements on First Amendment rights obviously had no basis 
in the Amendment's language; nor did his notion that indirect abridgments can 
be subjected to a balancing of competing interests, or his view that the Amend-
ment's otherwise absolute provisions do not grant persons a right to access 
to public property for purposes of expression. But those elements of his phi-
losophy did recognize the government's obvious power to control the use of 
public property while preserving a broad range of activities for the absolute 
protection he thought commanded by the Amendment's literal terms. Had Black 
accepted the contention that speech-related conduct and a right of access to 
public property are within the Amendment's direct ambit, he would have been 
forced to abandon absolutism for all First Amendment contexts. Given the 
Amendment's language , such an approach was for Black, unthinkable. The 
balancing approach which he advanced in such cases enabled him to give the 
Amendment a literal application in most contexts without at the same time 
endorsing the untenable notion that any activity somehow connected with the 
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Amendment's expressly stated freedoms also had absolute protection from 
government interference. 
If Justice Black's First Amendment jurisprudence most clearly reflects the 
Justice's commitment to literalism, his interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 's first section, and of due process alone, clearly illustrates his commitment 
to historical intent. His Fourteenth Amendment and due process jurisprudence 
also further illustrate his penchant for clear legal standards and for limitations 
on the scope of judicial discretion. In the years following the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's adoption, the Supreme Court had consistently rejected the notion that 
the Fourteenth Amendment embodied the Bill of Rights, thus refusing to apply 
those guarantees to the state governments. Instead, the Court interpreted 
the Amendment's due process clause and its Fifth Amendment counterpart to 
mean, in essence, that government may deprive a person of life, liberty, or 
property only through "fair" procedures and "reasonable" laws. The Court's 
use of this construction of due process to write its own laissez faire notions 
into the Constitution and strike down "unreasonable" economic controls 22 in-
furiated the populist Senator Black23 and, following his appointment to the 
bench, he took a major role in dismantling such precedents . He also made a 
detailed study of the history of due process and the Fourteenth Amendment's 
adoption. From that research he concluded that the Amendment's framers had 
intended its first section, taken separately and as a whole, to apply the Bill of 
Rights to the states. 24 He further concluded that the original meaning of due 
process in English and American law was essentially that of the "law of the 
land" provision in the English Magna Carta - a guarantee that government 
may interfere with the individual's life, liberty, or property only according to 
valid, pre-existing laws and procedures. 25 
During his judicial career, Justice Black occasionally found unstated indi-
vidual rights within the meaning of due process. He believed, for example, 
that due process forbids vague laws26 and convictions based on no evidence. 
At the end of his career, moreover, he refused to say that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's privileges or immunities clause was limited in meaning to the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 28 But the prohibitions against vague laws and 
baseless convictions seem consistent with the notion that government should 
proceed according to law, and in only one case did Black join an opinion ex-
panding the privileges or immunities clause beyond the Bill of Rights. 29 There-
fore in applying the Fourteenth Amendment's first section, apart from its equal 
protection clause, Justice Black normally limited the Amendment's scope to 
the Bill of Rights and to the requirement that states follow existing laws and 
procedures. He also consistently rejected any interpretation of due process 
- or related provisions and doctrines - which would empower judges to add 
rights to the Constitution or graft their conceptions of "fair" procedures or 
"reasonable" laws onto the document's text. 30 
Like certain earlier efforts, the most recent study to appear on the subject 
generally endorses Justice Black's total incorporation position. 31 Even so, many 
judicial and scholarly critics have vehemently attacked his stance, arguing, 
among other things, that state legislatures would never have ratified an amend-
ment tying their governments to all the specifics of the Bill of Rights. 32 Justice 
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Black rejected such contentions as a sort of "negative pregnant, " placing his 
reliance instead on the proincorporation statements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's sponsors - the usual method, as he was quick to point out, for de-
termining the original intent underlying a legal provision. 33 Whatever the 
substantive merits of his reading of history , his incorporation stance was com-
patible with his desire to limit judicial discretion and promote clear-cut inter-
pretations of constitutional provisions - conditions he thought imperative if 
the Constitution, not the judge, was to govern. The words of the Bill of Rights 
are not self-interpreting. Arguably, however, they have a greater degree of 
specificity - and thus greater potential for limiting judicial choice - than do 
standards of "fairness" or "reasonableness. " 
Essentially the same observation can be made of Justice Black's "law of 
the land" interpretation of due process . Black's critics long contended that due 
process was an evolving concept not intended to be locked into the context of 
a particular era. They also argued that the Supreme Court had given due 
process such a flexible interpretation long before Black's elevation to the bench. 
Justice Frankfurter often expressed admiration ,34 for example, for Justice Mill-
er's interpretation of due process in Twining v. New Jersey.35 In Black's 
defense, on the other hand, a strong argument can be made that, despite the 
expansive language of Twining and certain other early cases, due process was 
for years given an interpretation closely paralleling Black's "law of the land" 
position. For example, Justice Miller in his Twining opinion employed seemingly 
expansive language in describing the content of due process , but then observed: 
The essential elements of due process of law [as a 
procedural requirement) ... are singularly few, though of 
wide application and deep significance . . . Due process 
requires that the court which assumes to determine the 
rights of parties shall have jurisdiction .. . and that there 
shall be notice and opportunity for hearing given the parties 
. . . Subject to these two fundamental conditions, which 
seem to be universally prescribed in all systems of law 
established by civilized countries, this court has, up to this 
time, sustained all state laws . . . regulating procedure, 
evidence , and methods of trial, and held them to be con-
sistent with due process of law. 36 
Again, moreover, whatever the historic basis for Black's stance, his "law of 
the land" conception of due process is obviously a more clear-cut standard for 
judges as well as the rest of us than one giving judges power to invalidate 
procedures and laws found to be "shocking to the conscience," "arbitrary ," or 
"unreasonable." 
What Justice Black considered to be the "literal" or historically intended 
meaning of specific procedural guarantees imposed equally clear-cut restrictions 
on governmental power. He saw in the power of judges to issue directed 
verdicts to juries, for example, a departure from the literal meaning of the 
Seventh Amendment , which commands that "no fact tried by a jury shall be 
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the 
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rules of the common law." In his view, "a verdict should be directed, if at all, 
only when, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there is in the 
evidence no room whatever for honest differences of opinion over the factual 
issue in controversy." 37 Nor could he see any room for flexible interpretations 
of the Fifth Amendment's command that no person ''be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself." He thus rejected the Court's conclusion 
that only "testimonial," not "physical," evidence is protected from compulsory 
seizure by police. 38 As in the First Amendment field, however, he refused to 
expand procedural rights beyond their literal or historic meaning. He opposed 
the notions, for example, that the death penalty - a widely accepted form of 
punishment at the time of the Constitution's adoption - was now a per se 
violation of the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment39 or that the 
right to trial by impartial jury requires twelve-member panels. 40 
Of course, Justice Black recognized that certain constitutional clauses do 
not readily lend themselves to precise interpretations which limit the range of 
judicial discretion, but that they instead call for the sort of case-to-case judicial 
balancing of competing interests which he abhorred. 41 In applying such pro-
visions, Black attempted to be as literal as the language at issue would permit 
or to confine the provision's meaning to the historical context within which it 
was framed. But when a judgment on the reasonableness of governmental 
action was necessary, he generally deferred to government, thereby reflecting 
once again his reluctance to substitute judicial determinations of reasonableness 
for those of legislative and administrative authorities. 
One such provision was the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against "un-
reasonable" searches and seizures . Throughout his career, Justice Black re-
fused to extend the Amendment's meaning to police eavesdrop practices, 
emphasizing that its provisions referred only to the search and seizure of 
"persons, houses, papers, and effects," not words, and that , in any event, it 
would be impossible to describe a conversation that had not yet taken place, 
indeed might never occur, with the particularity demanded by the Amendment's 
warrant clause. 42 In addition, he was generally deferential to police judgments 
regarding the reasonableness of searches and the need to proceed without a 
warrant - so much so, that Jacob Landynski, the principal critic of Black's 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, has complained that adoption of the Justice's 
position would effectively negate the strictures of the warrant provisions. Given 
the warrant clause, Landynski has argued, the Fourth Amendment's ban on 
unreasonable searches and seizures should be construed to forbid warrantless 
searches, and presumable arrests, absent the most exigent circumstances. In 
failing to apply the reasonableness standard in that light, Black according to 
Landynski, had denied the Amendment its full meaning. 43 
With due respect, Landynski may have read more into the Amendment's 
meaning than was originally intended by its framers. As he has acknowledged, 
the Fourth Amendment was principally directed at the hated writs of assistance, 
general warrants which, in Landynski's words, amounted to "a lifetime hunting 
license." 44 The framers' intent to eliminate the general warrant is arguably a 
far cry from the notion that most searches must be accompanied by a warrant. 
Another aspect of Landynski's concerns with the Black stance in Fourth Amend-
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ment cases, however, has a firmer basis. Black obviously had great difficulty 
deciding whether the Constitution required the exclusion of illegally seized 
evidence from judicial proceedings. Over the course of his career, he rejected 
the exclusionary rule, then decided that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
combined required its application, later based it only on the Fifth Amendment, 
and, at the end of his career, again seemed to deny that the rule had any 
constitutional basis. 45 Landynski's criticism of such inconsistency is well-taken. 
Given Black's judicial philosophy, though, the difficulty the rule caused him is 
not surprising. It is simply another reflection of his reluctance to read his own 
views into the Constitution's language. 
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause gave Justice Black 
similar difficulties. As noted previously, the early history of Due Process en-
abled Black to ascribe a relatively fixed, "Jaw of the land" interpretation to the 
due process guarantee. But history afforded him no similar opportunity with 
the equal protection guarantee. Nor was its general language any comfort to 
a judge concerned with restricting the scope of judicial choice. Thus it was not 
surprising when shortly before his death he suggested that the guarantee might 
best have been left out of the Constitution or worded differently- not because 
he objected to the racial equality the clause was obviously intended to protect, 
but because of its nebulous, open-ended general character. Not surprisingly, 
too, he added that the Court probably should never have given the clause any 
semantic gloss or allowed its meaning to be extended beyond racial discrimi-
nation, although he believed such developments inevitable. 46 
Confronted with the guarantee's indefinite language and a historical record 
which only partially revealed its framers' intent, Black subjected discriminations 
based on race, and on companion criteria of national origin and alienage, to 
strict judicial scrutiny. 47 With few exceptions, however, he extended substan-
tial, if not complete, deference to other forms of discrimination. He joined a 
number of Warren era and earlier opinions imposing strict review on discrim-
inatory laws based on "suspect" classifications other than race and on regu-
lations which interfered with "fundamental" rights not stated elsewhere in the 
Constitution. He even authored the Court's opinion in Korematsu v. United 
States, 48 which provided the semantic basis for the "suspect" categories branch 
of this "two-tiered" equal protection standard; he also wrote for the Court in 
Williams v. Rhodes, 49 a classic statement of the "fundamental rights" branch 
of modem equal protection philosophy. His original draft in both cases, 50 how-
ever, omitted such semantics, suggesting that they may have been inserted 
at the request of a colleague rather than on Black's own initiative. In many 
other cases, moreover, he made clear his general opposition to the use of the 
vague equal protection concept as "a handy instrument to strike down state 
laws which the Court feels are based on bad governmental policy." Outside 
the field of racial discrimination, he argued, the Court had traditionally upheld 
discriminatory regulations so long as they were "not 'irrelevant,' 'unreasonable,' 
'arbitrary,' or 'invidious."' Those standards, like the clause itself, were ad-
mittedly "vague and indefinite." In Black's judgment, however, they meant 
that "under a proper interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause states are 
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to have the broadest kind of leeway in areas where they have a general 
constitutional competence to act." 51 
Justice Black did not always appear faithful to his general equal protection 
philosophy. He joined the Court's holding that the clause requires state and 
local apportionment schemes to adhere to the "one person, one vote" prin-
ciple. 52 He also was willing to subject discriminatory criminal procedures to 
stricter review than his normal policy of deference in non-racial cases would 
seem to allow. 53 He authored the Court's opinion, for example, in Griffin v. 
lllinois, 54 holding that indigent defendants must be furnished free trial tran-
scripts in preparing their appeals where their more prosperous counterparts 
were pennitted to purchase a transcript. On closer analysis, however, these 
apparent inconsistencies can be squared with the broader contours of his con-
stitutional philosophy. In that apportionment field, Black contented that the 
people are sovereign and that, in such a system, any deviation from population 
equality in apportionment is "irrational. " 55 The "one person, one vote" rule 
also arguably provides a more precise and less flexible standard than one 
allowing judges to rule on the reasonableness of particular apportionment sys-
tems. Black believed, too, that both due process and equal protection required 
strict review of discriminatory criminal procedures; and his belief that due 
process demands that government proceed according to even-handed, pre-
existing Jaws and procedures would appear compatible with the strict review 
he believed necessary in such cases. In the main, moreover, Black was con-
sistent in his position that equal protection requires strict scrutiny of racial 
discrimination, but extreme deference to government in other fields. Such a 
view arguably provided a more clear-cut approach for judges than one in which 
courts may vary the standard of review according to the basis for a challenged 
discrimination or the "fundamental right or interest" affected. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Black's critics have difficulty accepting his insistence that his inter-
pretations of constitutional provisions largely flowed from a commitment to 
text and historical intent. In the 1960's, Wallace Mendelson, Black's most 
persistent scholarly critic, began to accuse the Justice of liberal activism, com-
plaining that he "leans one way when 'liberal' values are at stake and another 
way in the face of 'conservative' values." 56 By 1970, on the other hand, 
Glendon Schubert was asserting that "biological aging" or "cultural dissonance" 
had converted Black into a defender of "orthodox conservative dogma." 57 
Jacob Landynski sees Black's narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
as a reflection of the Justice's distaste for criminals;58 and Sylvia Snowiss 
attributes his opposition to direct constitutional protection for the political 
protests of the 1960's to his concerns about the "permissiveness" of that era 
and its rejection, in his view, "of the virtues of 'character, morality, hard work, 
and self-denial."' 59 Nor have such policy-oriented assessments been confined 
to his critics. In her admiring 1950 profile, Charlotte Williams placed Black in 
"that school of thought which holds that every judge ... writes into his opinions 
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his own economic, social, and political ideas and that the notion of judicial 
impartiality is little more than a myth." 60 Moreover Black's law clerk John 
Frank early depicted the Justice, as a jurist able "to devise ways - new ways 
if need be - of serving what in his conception is the largest good," 6 1 while 
Charles Reich, another clerk, once wrote that Black's conception of the judicial 
function permits "doctrine to keep pace with the times." 62 
It is difficult, however, to accept such value-based interpretations of Jus-
tice Black's judicial and constitutional philosophy, especially in view of the 
conflicting policy directions in which his approach to constitutional issues carried 
him. Glendon Schubert 's image of an increasingly conservative aging jurist fails 
to adequately explain, for example, why Black's "conservatism" was so selec-
tive and why the same judge, if in fact motivated by policy preferences, could 
oppose constitutional status for civil rights protests yet continue to support 
absolute protection for pornography, libel, and slander. Professor Snowiss' 
assertions regarding the relationship between Black's concerns about contem-
porary social trends and his reaction to certain civil liberties claims raise similar 
questions. And Jacob Landynski really should have attempted to explain why 
Black's distaste for criminals prompted extreme deference to police in Fourth 
Amendment cases, yet never in cases involving application of the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. The conflicting pat-
terns of Black's votes suggest not a policy-oriented jurisprudence, but a 
technical conception of the judicial function which largely transcended individual 
policy preferences. 
Such a position, as noted at the beginning of this article, is anathema to 
those who favor a policy-based approach to judicial decision-making, including 
most of Justice Black's critics. Professor Snowiss, for example, found Black's 
opposition to "qualitative" judgments by judges perhaps the "one underlying 
problem in all of Justice Black's work," adding: "If not related to meaningful 
conceptions of justice, judgments of constitutionality will not be able to sur-
vive." 63 For one who accepts interpretivism as the only approach to judging 
compatible with the notion of a written Constitution, however, Justice Black's 
jurisprudence offers a workable alternative to value-laden decision-making. His 
reading of the Constitution's "literal" terms and his conclusions regarding the 
intent of its framers wre obviously imperfect, as he himself no doubt recognized . 
Arguably, however, they provide clearer legal standards than more policy-
oriented approaches as well as a jurisprudence which substantially limits the 
scope of judicial choice without sacrificing the Constitution's essential character 
as higher law. 
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